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a b s t r a c t
Recent work suggests that Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs)—or ‘‘patent trolls’’—are a new form of
financial intermediary. According to this view, individual patent holders are unable to contract with large
manufacturers because they lack the financial resources necessary to litigate against infringement. Since
individual patent holders are heterogeneous in their constraints and preferences, the market function of
PAEs should depend on their specific demands. We conducted an experiment in which subjects from
a population of interest were each assigned patents that were infringed by large manufacturers in a
hypothetical scenario.We relaxed the financial constraints of some patent holders and evaluatedwhether
this randomized intervention subsequently reduced the demand for PAEs relative to costly litigation. Our
results indicate that PAEs served an intermediary function for two groups in our sample: subjects who
identified as inventors rather than entrepreneurs, and subjects who were relatively more sensitive to
financial losses.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The proliferation of patent assertion entities (PAEs), pejora-
tively known as ‘‘patent trolls’’, has become an important public
policy issue. PAEs are specialized firms that acquire patents and
then seek licensing revenues fromoperating companies. A growing
literature suggests that PAEs are a new type of financial interme-
diary (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013). According to this view, individual
patent holders are unable to contract with largemanufacturers be-
cause they lack the financial resources necessary to litigate against
infringement. PAEs therefore provide liquidity to patent markets
by allowing these individuals to profit from their intellectual prop-
erty (Golden, 2007; McDonough III, 2006). Even among individual
patent holders, however, there is substantial variation in financial
constraints and preferences. The aim of this paper is to identify the
individual-level characteristics that constitute the demand for in-
termediaries in patent markets.
We conducted an experiment in which subjects from a popula-
tion of interest were each assigned patents that were infringed by
large manufacturers in a hypothetical scenario. We relaxed the fi-
nancial constraints of some patent holders and evaluated whether
this randomized intervention subsequently reduced the demand
for PAEs relative to costly litigation. Our results indicate that PAEs
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jects who identified as inventors rather than entrepreneurs, and
subjects who were relatively more sensitive to financial losses.
The results of our experiment have important implications for
patent reform. First, PAEs play a complex role in patent markets.
Under some conditions they may represent a tax on innovation,
while under others they may provide value through financial
intermediation. Second, reforms designed to curtail the activity of
PAEs could suppress the role that certain kinds of individual patent
holders play in the innovation ecosystem.
2. Patent trolls as intermediaries
The literature on PAEs as intermediaries suggests that litigation
costs are prohibitive given the financial constraints faced by
individual patent holders. Large manufacturers are then able to
pursue an ‘‘efficient infringement’’ strategy: rather than entering
into licensing agreements, they infringe the patent and then fight
any lawsuit until the individual gives up.
We hypothesize that PAEs play a particularly important in-
termediary role for two types of individual patent holder. First,
we expect that the demand for financial intermediation should
be greater for inventors than entrepreneurs. Our intuition is that
inventors face greater financial constraints than entrepreneurs,
who tend to come from higher-income families than other self-
employed individuals (Levine and Rubinstein, 2015). This hypoth-
esis is consistent with historical evidence that intermediaries such
as patent agents and attorneys helped inventors sell their patent
le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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(Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2003). This market structure was es-
pecially beneficial to those inventors whose financial constraints
would not have allowed them to pursue entrepreneurial activity
(Khan, 2014).
Second, we expect that the demand for financial intermediation
from PAEs should be greater among subjects who are relatively
more sensitive to financial losses. An individual patent holder who
unsuccessfully sues an infringer will experience a net loss, and
protracted cases may even pose a risk of bankruptcy. The prospect
of net losses has been shown to be a particularly important
determinant of decisions regarding litigation (Zamir and Ritov,
2010).
3. Experimental design
The empirical literature on intellectual property has recently
turned to experimental evidence (Buchanan and Wilson, 2014).
However, applying the traditional methods of incentivized labo-
ratory experiments to real patents would be financially prohibitive
and potentially illegal. Therefore, the experimenter can either con-
duct an incentivized experiment with vastly smaller stakes or
present subjects with a realistic but hypothetical scenario. We
chose to construct a hypothetical scenario that closely reflects the
context of our hypothesis based on research showing that subjects
use similar decision-making criteria in survey experiments as they
do in real-world scenarios (Hainmueller et al., 2015).
We conducted the experiment on a subject pool that reflects our
population of interest: individuals who are either active inventors
or engaged in the process of commercializing inventions. We
invited approximately 1200 current and former members of five
different innovation programs at Stanford University and UC-
Berkeley to participate in an online survey. The response rate was
9.3%, which is standard in the survey methodology literature. We
dropped nine responses from our analysis because respondents
either failed an attention check or otherwise indicated that their
responses would not reflect their behavior in the real world,
leaving a total of 103 responses. Nearly 60% of these subjects
indicated that they had previously filed a patent application.
Our experimental design was based on the insight that
contingent fee litigation — which eliminates upfront costs and the
prospect of net losses— alleviatesmany of the financial constraints
facing individual patent holders (Schwartz, 2012). Therefore, if
PAEs act as financial intermediaries for individual patent holders,
then the demand for PAEs should decrease when contingent fees
are available.
All subjects began the experiment by thinking about a product
they used regularly and then proposing an improvement to that
product. Next, subjects were told to imagine that they had been
awarded a patent for this idea that they estimated was worth
approximately $1 million. Then, all subjects were informed that a
large corporation decided to infringe the patent.
Each subject was then randomly assigned to either a control or
treatment condition. Subjects in the control condition were asked
to choose between two options: sell their patent to a PAE for a
guaranteed $100,000, or hire a lawyer to assert their patent in
court for $1000 per hour with no limit on the number of hours
required. Subjects in the treatment condition were given the same
two options, except that the lawyer worked on a contingent fee
basis of one-third of the total award if they won the case and zero
dollars otherwise. Therefore, the only feature that varied across
groups was that treated subjects were no longer constrained by
upfront costs or the prospect of net losses.1
1 A randomization check confirms that the two experimental groups were
balanced across all observable covariates.Next, subjects indicated the lowest offer they would have
accepted from the PAE, regardless of their prior decision. This
question serves as a comprehension check, since responses from
subjects who chose to hire the lawyer should be strictly greater
than $100,000. In addition, we use this measure of subjects’
willingness-to-accept (WTA) as an alternative dependent variable
in our empirical analysis.
We then elicited subjects’ preferences regarding financial risks
and losses through a series of hypothetical coin flips.2 First,
subjects chose between a positive outcome and a non-negative
gamble: a guaranteed $1, or a 50% chance of winning $2 and $0
otherwise. Since both options are equal in expectation, we code
subjects who chose the guaranteed $1 as ‘‘risk averse’’. Second,
subjects chose between a positive outcome and a mixed gamble:
(1) a 100% chance of winning $1; or (2) a 50% chance of winning
$3 and a 50% chance of losing $1. This choice better reflects the
patent assertion contextwhere a plaintiff can experience a net loss.
We refer to subjects who chose the guaranteed $1 as ‘‘loss averse’’,
since they avoided an equivalent option that contained the loss
domain.3
Finally, we collected demographic information about our
subjects, including whether they described themselves as either
inventors or entrepreneurs, whether they had previously filed a
patent application, as well as their age, gender, and academic
background.
4. Results
First, we tested the hypothesis that PAEs play a greater
intermediary role for inventors than entrepreneurs. Fig. 1 shows
the proportion of subjects who chose to sell their patent to the
PAE, along with 95% confidence intervals, for both sub-groups.
As expected, the treatment reduced the percentage of inventors
who chose to sell to a PAE by nearly three-fold, while the effect
on entrepreneurs was trivial. Logistic regression confirms the
significance of the main effect on inventors (p = 0.012) as well as
the interaction term (p = 0.053). Since our moderating variable
was not experimentally manipulated, we included age, gender,
prior patent filing, business training, risk aversion, loss aversion,
and program fixed effects as control variables. We also replicated
our results using a conditional fixed-effectsmodel,whichmitigates
the degree of incidental parameter bias in logistic regressions with
small samples, as well as using subjects’ reported willingness-to-
accept as an alternative dependent variable.
Next, we evaluated whether treatment effects were relatively
larger for subjects who exhibited loss aversion in our coin flip
exercise. Fig. 2 shows that the contingent fee treatment cut in half
the percentage of loss-averse subjects who chose to sell to a PAE,
while the effect on loss-neutral subjects was insignificant. Logistic
regression confirms the significance of the main effect on loss-
averse subjects (p = 0.006) as well as the interaction term (p =
0.035). Since loss-aversion was not experimentally manipulated,
we included all the same control variables and fixed effects as
in the previous analysis. Once again, these results were robust to
conditional fixed-effects models or to using subjects’ WTA as the
dependent variable.
One potential concern is that our measure of loss aversion
includes risk preferences. We adjusted the model specification
2 The denomination of payoffs in both exercises is purposely trivial because we
did not want responses to be anchored by the previous decision in the patent
assertion context.
3 We recognize that ‘‘loss aversion’’ has a formal definition in behavioral
economics, in which losses are valued more highly than gains (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). For the purpose of this study, we choose a slightly different
operationalization that is better aligned with our experimental design.
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Fig. 2. Treatment effects by loss aversion.
to include risk aversion as the moderator and loss aversion as a
control variable, but the interaction term was insignificant (p =
0.237). Therefore, we conclude that preferences regarding net
losses — and not risk — were the primary driver of heterogeneous
demand for financial intermediation.
5. Conclusion
The proliferation of PAEs has become both an important public
policy issue aswell as the subject of intense academic debate. Some
studies claim that PAEs extract rents via nuisance lawsuits, thereby
placing a direct tax on innovation. An alternative hypothesis is that
PAEs are financial intermediaries that facilitate innovation. These
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive.
The goal of this paper was to begin to identify the conditions
under which PAEs act as financial intermediaries. We predicted
that two types of individual patent holders should be especiallyconstrained by the costs of litigation: inventors (rather than
entrepreneurs) and individuals who are relatively more sensitive
to financial losses. The results of our experiment were consistent
with these hypotheses.
We believe these results have two important policy implica-
tions. First, the effect of PAEs may vary according to the demands
of specific actors in patent markets. Second, if there are conditions
under which PAEs serve as financial intermediaries, then policy re-
forms designed to curb their operation might also reduce the role
of some individual inventors in the innovation ecosystem.
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